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Licensing Repression: Dissent, Threats
and State Repression in the United States
Christian Davenport*
The "War on Terror" has raised a great number of questions
about how and why political authorities use coercion against
those within their territorial jurisdiction. For example, within
existing literature, state authorities are generally depicted as
being the protectors of the status quo.' When behavior takes
place that threatens the safety of citizens and/or the security of
government personnel, policies and institutions (e.g.,
demonstrations, acts of terrorism or civil war), it is expected
that relevant political agents will apply repressive behavior in
an effort to eliminate the challenging activity and to restore
domestic order.2 This practice is commonly referred to as the
"Threat Model" of state repression.3  For over 30 years,
* Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland-College Park;
Director of the Radical Information Project.
1. See FRANK DONNER, PROTECTORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED SQUADS AND
POLICE REPRESSION IN URBAN AMERICA 1 (1990) (noting that the police have
served "as the protective arm of the economic and political interests of the
capitalist system").
2. See, e.g., Alexander DALLIN & GEORGE BRESLAUER, POLITICAL TERROR IN
COMMUNIST SYSTEMS (1970); MARK IRVING LICHBACH, THE REBEL'S DILEMMA (1995);
WILLIAM STANLEY, THE PROTECTION RACKET STATE: ELITE POLITICS, MILITARY
EXTORTION, AND CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR (1996); CHARLES TILLY, FROM
MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION (1978); EUGENE V. WALTER, TERROR AND
RESISTANCE; A STUDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, WITH CASE STUDIES OF SOME
PRIMITIVE AFRICAN COMMMUNITIES (1969); Raymond Duvall & Michael Stohl,
Governance by Terror, in THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM (Michael Stohl, ed. 3d ed.
1988); Scott Gartner & Pat Regan, Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear
Relationship Between Government and Opposition Violence, 33 J. PEACE RES. 273
(1996); Ted Robert Gurr, Persisting Patterns of Repression and Rebellion:
Foundations for a General Theory of Political Coercion, in PERSISTENT PATTERNS
AND EMERGENT STRUCTURES IN A WANING CENTURY (Margaret P. Karns, ed. 1986).
3. Jennifer Earl, Tanks, Tear Gas and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement
Repression, 21 SOC. THEORY 44 (2003).
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quantitative analyses have supported this relationship. Across
time, space, context, measures and statistical methods, dissent
has increased repression in every single investigation of the
topic. 4 While this empirical result is relevant to many areas of
political science (e.g., democracy, power and civil society), it is
particularly important for understandings of political conflict
and human rights. Given the consistency of this finding in
conjunction with the varied influence of repression on dissent,5
it is likely the case that this represents the only known law in
research concerning state-dissident interactions - what I refer
to as the Law of Coercive Monopolization, where dissent
sometimes responds to repression, but repression always
respond to dissent.
While impressive in the sheer amount of support that the
"Threat Model" has received, within this article I argue that
existing work is misleading because it generally ignores the fact
that repressive behavior could be applied without an overt
behavioral challenge being present or that it significantly
exceeds the amount of dissent that exists at the time under
investigation. To qualitative scholars of repressive action 6 and
those living amidst periods of international and/or domestic
4. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HIBBS, MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1973); Christen
Davenport & David A. Armstrong II, Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights:
A Statistical Analysis from 1976-1996, 48 AM J. POL. Sci. 538 (2004); Christen
Davenport, Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition, 43 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
92 (1999) [hereinafter Davenport (1999)]; Christen Davenport, Multi-Dimensional
Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry Into Why States Apply Negative
Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCi. 683 (1995) [hereinafter Davenport (1995)]; Matthew
Krain, State-Sponsored Mass Murder: A Study of the Onset and Severity of
Genocides and Politicides, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 331 (1997); Barbara Harff, No
Lessons Learned from the Holocaust: Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass
Murder since 1955, 97 AM. J. POL. SCI. REV. 57 (2003); Will Moore, Repression and
Dissent: Substitution, Context and Timing, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 851 (1998); Steven C.
Poe, C. Neal Tate & Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human Right to Personal
Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43
INT'L STUD. Q. 291 (1999); John King, Repression, Domestic Threat, and Interactions
in Argentina and Chile, 26 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 1 (1998); Sabine C. Zanger, A Global
Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-
1993, 37 J. PEACE RES. 213 (2000).
5. See, e.g., D.KI Gupta et al, Government Coercion of Dissidents-Deterrence
or Provocation 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 301 (1993); Mark Lichbach, Deterrence or
Escalation?: The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent, 31 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 266 (1987); Moore, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., DONNER, supra note 1; ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL
REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT (1978); STANLEY,
supra note 2; WALTER, supra note 2.
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crisis, such observations would not come as a surprise because it
is clear that authorities do not always wait for dissident
behavior to (re)occur and they do not always apply repression
proportionate to the challenge they are confronted with. On the
contrary, it is frequently the case that political leaders identify
threats after some dissent has taken place on the grounds that
additional conflict is forthcoming (e.g., the current campaign
against terrorism in the US and abroad) or they identify threats
before dissent takes place in an attempt to head off possible
challenges (e.g., the US campaign against communists during
the Red Scare from the 1930s through the 1960s). In short,
governments "license" repressive action, giving themselves the
opportunity to pursue challengers and apply coercion without
the normal costs that accompany such behavior (e.g., being
removed from office).
These alternative conceptions of threat and state response
represent very different perspectives on political repressive
action. In the first (the behavioral), this activity serves as a
reactive mechanism of "law and order." Here, conflict occurs
and authority's respond. Adopting the second perspective (the
political), repression serves as a proactive mechanism of control.
In this case, repressive behavior does not respond to actual
dissent but to potential dissent identified by political leaders.
While both rely upon the Hobbesian notion that states should
and will protect their citizens as well as themselves when they
are threatened, the latter provides more opportunities for abuse
(i.e., potentially larger amounts of political sanctions) because it
does not rely on dissident behavior to justify state activity,
merely the perception of challenge as provided by those in
power. To date, quantitative research has focused exclusively
upon the first possibility; correspondingly, the second has
received no attention at all.
Within this paper, I begin with a discussion of the basic
theoretical model and research design that underlies work on
state repression/human rights violations. Second, I review and
critique this approach, introducing the concept of "licensing."
Within the third section, I present the data used in the study as
well as the specific methodology employed to examine them.
From the statistical analysis of U.S. state coercion between 1948
and 1982 (section 4), it is found that: 1) political threats matter,
consistently outweighing the influence of behavioral threats,
and 2) the influence of political threats varies according to the
2007]
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magnitude and type of the threat established at the time. The
conclusion explores the implications of this investigation for
future work in the area and it explores the implications of this
research for social activism and political reform as the "War on
Terror" is underway.
I. WHY STATES REPRESS
At present, the dominant theoretical approach for
investigating state repression combines elements of
structuralism and rationalism. 7  Within this framework,
political authorities engage in some form of cost-benefit analysis
as they consider the application of repressive action. The
components of this model emerge from diverse political-
economic and behavioral factors. For example, the "costs" of
repression include the removal from office that political leaders
might be subject to for implementing relevant coercive policies;
the "benefits" include factors such as the elimination of dissent,
political survival and the continuation of repressive or
accomodationist norms. To assess the probability of repressive
action, the costs and benefits of repression are weighed against
the existence of alternative mechanisms of control such as
normative influence or economic development. As conceived,
when costs are low, benefits are high and effective alternatives
are not available, repression is anticipated. When costs are
high, benefits are low and effective alternatives are available,
however, repression is not expected.
It is clear from existing literature that not all components of
the model receive comparable levels of scrutiny; indeed, several
components have received the bulk of attention. For instance,
individuals have consistently investigated the influence of
dissent,8  democracy,9  economic development, 10  trade-
7. See, e.g., DALLIN & BRESLAUER, supra note 2; GURR, supra note 2; STOHL,
supra note 2, at 33; WALTER, supra note 2; Gartner & Regan, supra note 2;
Lichbach, supra note 4; E.N. Muller, Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and
Political Violence, 50 AM. Soc. REv. 47 (1985).
8. See, e.g., HIBBS, supra note 4; Davenport (1995), supra note 4; Gartner &
Regan, supra note 2; Poe, Tate & Keith, supra note 4.
9. See, e.g., HIBBS, supra note 4; Davenport & Armstrong, supra note 3;
Davenport (1999), supra note 3; Poe, Tate & Keith, supra note 4; Zanger, supra note
4.
10. See, e.g., HIBBS, supra note 4, at 44-54; Davenport (1995), supra note 4, at
685, 691-2; Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political
[Vol. 16:2
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dependence, 1 population 12 and the role of the military. 13 In all
cases, the expectations of the decision calculus have been borne
out. Variables associated with increasing costs have
consistently decreased repression, 14 variables associated with
increasing the benefits of repressive activity have consistently
increased the likelihood that this behavior would be used 15 and
variables associated with alternative mechanisms of control 16
decrease repression.
Regardless of the consistency with these findings, I argue
that this work is limited because it uniformly maintains that
authorities respond to political-economic endowments, dissident
behavior and prior repressive activity in an almost mechanistic
fashion; given certain contexts and previous contention,
repression will be applied. It is possible however, and I believe
more likely the case, that authorities try to alter the decision
calculus through activities of their own design - diminishing
costs, enhancing benefits and therefore increasing the likelihood
of repressive behavior. This acknowledges the previously
neglected role played by agency in state repression and it
reveals that political authorities are not just reacting to
situations, but they are also actively involved in creating them.
The point is frequently highlighted in more qualitative research
on the topic,17 but it is completely ignored within the
quantitative literature.
II. LICENSING REPRESSION
As designed, the basic logic underlying the existing
approach to study repression is both straightforward and
commonsensical. Upon very little reflection, it seems reasonable
Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476, 488-92 (1988); Poe
& Tate, supra note 4, at 294, 296.
11. See e.g., David L. Richards, Ronald D. Gelleny, & David H. Sacko, Money
with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for
Human Rights in Developing Countries, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 223-24 (2001).
12. See, e.g., Poe & Tate, supra note 4, at 294.]
13. See, e.g., Davenport (1995), supra note 4, at 687-89.
14. See Poe & Tate, supra note 4, at 293, 296.
15. See id. at 293.
16. See id.
17. See Dallin & Breslauer, supra note 2, at 5-8; Goldstein, supra note 6, at
xvii-xxi; WILLIAM STANLEY, THE PROTECTION RACKET STATE: ELITE POLITICS,
MILITARY EXTORTION, AND CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR 164-69 (1996); Walter, supra
note 2, at 42-55.]
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to acknowledge that authorities are concerned with the factors
identified in the previous section - especially the costs of
repressive behavior. Almost no state can afford to use
repression if such activity will significantly diminish their
resources or legitimacy. At the same time, it also seems
reasonable to acknowledge that authorities are frequently
involved with trying to alter the components of the decision
calculus to something more favorable to their desires. Under
these circumstances, political leaders would attempt to create
opportunities to eliminate rivals with repression when they had
the chance.18 Dissent provides a perfect opportunity for this.
A. BEHAVIORAL THREATS
Within prior research, "threats" are exclusively behavioral
in nature - e.g., a boycott, demonstration or an instance of
terrorism takes place. This type of threat is important because
states probably benefit from countering and/or eliminating such
activity and they likely enhance the probability of surviving
politically as well as increasing legitimacy. The behavioral
threat is also important because it reduces the costs of applying
repressive action. For instance, within periods of behavioral
threat, few citizens would be unwilling to allow authorities to
enact repression; this is perhaps the closest situation to "just" or
legitimate repressive action that one could find. Indeed, many
have argued that individuals within threatened societies are
more apt to view coercion as legitimate for it seeks to protect the
status quo - one of the primary objectives of political leaders
and one of the primary expectations of citizens.1 9 Behavioral
threats are thus crucial to understand because when authorities
receive a benefit from coercively responding to dissent and when
they do not fear sanctions for this behavior, it is likely the case
that authorities would use coercion. Discussed above, the
literature has supported this argument quite well.
18. It is important to acknowledge that I assume that political authorities
always have some domestic rival that they would like to limit, deter and/or
eliminate. Repression is one common approach toward this end.
19. Public opinion research on this point is quite clear. See, e.g., Darren W.
Davis & Brian D. Silver, Civil Liberties v. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of
the Terrorist Attacks on America, 48 AM. J. POL. Sci. 28 (2004). Research on human
rights violations, however, avoids this issue for underlying the research program is
the inherent illegitimacy, illegality and unacceptability of coercive behavior.
[Vol. 16:2
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B. POLITICAL THREATS
Actual behavioral challenges represent only one scenario in
which governments can overcome the costs associated with state
repression. For instance, political leaders can also establish
threats through press statements/releases, congressional
hearings and the creation of laws based on the argument that
potential challenges might occur in the future. 20  The
establishment of these threats is important for three reasons.
First, it prepares citizens for what is to come and it provides
an explanation/justification for state behavior. These
preparatory efforts not only seek to reduce the costs of applying
repressive activity but they also seek to convert them into
benefits where the population would come to view the
authority's activity as legitimate and even necessary. Within
the context of threat, repressive applications make authorities
appear as if they are fulfilling an important service: the
protection of citizens and the existing political economy. As
such, we would expect that
Hypothesis 1: State repression will increase when political
threats are established.
Second, political threats are important because they can
outweigh the direct influence of behavioral threats as they
provide a compelling reason for citizens as well as authorities to
reweigh the different components of the decision calculus in
favor of state repressive activity. Here, I expect that when
placed in the same model,
Hypothesis 2: Political threats would outweigh the influence
of behavioral threats.
Third, it is possible that political threats have interactive
effects. For instance,
Hypothesis 3: When political threats are established and
dissent takes place, it is expected that the positive influence of
dissent would be much greater than when political threats did
not exist (in other words, the interaction between political
threats and dissent will be statistically as well as substantively
significant).
This influence is explained by the fact that state
responsiveness to behavioral threat lies at the heart of a
20. One could also argue that the objectives of challengers are important. See
generally WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST (1975).
2007]
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regime's legitimacy. 21 In a context where political authorities
have identified threats as being worthy of attention, this is
magnified several-fold. Indeed, within this scenario, if
challengers are not met swiftly and severely, the regime could
lose even more legitimacy than had there been no declaration at
all - something that political leaders would prefer to avoid.
C. BEHAVIOR TRUMPS POLITICS
Conventional wisdom (the Threat model) provides the rival
argument to the hypotheses identified above. From this view,
state repression is less sensitive to the influence of political
threats than it is to the actions undertaken by challengers.
Consequently, one would anticipate that when placed in the
same model
Hypothesis 4: The influence of dissent would outweigh
political threats, and
Hypothesis 5: The response of political authorities to
dissent would not vary across political threats, but rather it
would remain constant.
Of course, existing research also tells us that not all forms
of dissent are comparable in their levels of behavioral threat.
The primary distinction made within this work is between
violent and non-violent activity.22 Drawing upon this work, I
would suggest that
Hypothesis 6: Violent forms of dissent provoke authorities
to use repression in large amounts, whereas non-violent
activities are less likely to provoke such a response.
The importance of these behavioral hypotheses are
particularly important within a democracy - the focus of this
study - because these political systems are expected to react to
actual dissent and not something as intangible as a political
threat.23 Within the US, for example, there has been a large
debate regarding the legality of using repression against
citizens for reasons other than challenging behavior. 24 With
21. As Hobbes suggests, protecting citizens is one of the main objectives of the
state's claim to power and authority. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 132-33 (Michael
Oakeshott ed., New York, MacMillan 1962) (1651).
22. See Davenport (1995), supra note 4, at 687.
23. See C.E.S. Franks, Introduction to C.E.S. FRANKS, DISSENT AND THE STATE
1, 6-7, 19 (1989).
24. See, e.g., CYNTHIA BROWN, LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT AND THE ASSAULT ON
PERSONAL FREEDON (2003); KATHERINE DARMER, ROBERT BAIRD & STUART
[Vol. 16:2
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behavior threats, authorities have the evidence necessary to
justify the use of repressive action. Without dissent, however,
state coercion would likely be viewed as illegal and illegitimate,
across diverse audiences, for it hinders free speech, association
and so forth, seemingly without reason. It is not believed that
those subject to these actions or those responsible for enacting
them would tolerate such behavior.
III. DATA AND ANALYSIS
To operationalize my dependent variable and one of my
independent variables, I use what has remained one of the most
widely utilized cross-national databases in the social sciences:
the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators
(WHPSI).25 Specifically, I use the quarterly data on the United
States that is available from 1948 to 1982.
Within the WHPSI, the measure for repression (the
dependent variable) is labeled political sanctions. These are
"actions taken by the government to neutralize, to suppress, or
to eliminate perceived threat to the security of the government,
the regime, or the state itself."26 This includes political bans
and mass arrests. Event counts of these overt and essentially
non-violent actions are provided, by the quarter, over the
relevant period. The measures for behavioral threat (or dissent)
used in this study are drawn from the WHPSI as well. The five
variables used were: 1) political strikes; 27 2) student strikes;28 3)
protest demonstrations; 29 4) riots;30 and 5) armed attacks.31
ROSENBAUM, CIVIL LIBERTIES VS. NATIONAL SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD (2004);
C.E.D. FRANKS, DISSENT AND THE STATE (1989); PROTECTING WHAT MATTERS:
TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY, AND LIBERTY SINCE 9/11 (Clayton Northouse ed., 2006).
25. See, e.g., CHARLES L. TAYLOR & DAVID A. JODICE, WORLD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (vol. 1 & 2 1983); CHARLES L. TAYLOR & MICHAEL
C. HUDSON, WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (vol. 2 1972).
26. Taylor, supra note 25, at 6.
27. E.g., "[A] work stoppage by a body of industrial or service workers ... to
dissent a regime or its leaders' policies or actions." Taylor, supra note 25, at 4.
28. E.g., "[A] stoppage of normal academic life by students"... "to dissent a
regime or its leaders' policies or actions." Taylor, supra note 25, at 4.
29. E.g., "[A] non-violent gathering of people organized for the announced
purpose of dissenting a regime, a government, or one of its leaders; its ideology,
policy, or intended policy; or its previous action or intended action." Taylor, supra
note 25, at 2-3.
30. E.g., "[A] violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large number of
people" denoted by the "presence of violence." Taylor, supra note 25, at 3.
31. E.g., "[A] violent act undertaken to weaken another." Taylor, supra note
2007] 319
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Following a long-standing practice within the conflict
literature3 2 I create two event count measures of dissent from
these variables: one concerning non-violent behavior generated
by combining student and political strikes with demonstrations
and another concerning violent activity generated by combining
riots with armed attacks.
As provided in the previous section, I also created measures
for both international and domestic political threats. For this, I
conducted a detailed historical analysis of government records
as well as academic research and coded the dates affiliated with
a particular threat as 'T' while those years not associated with
this period are coded as "0." I have graphed these variables over
time with the measures of repression and dissent discussed
above.
Figure 1. State Repression and Political Dissent in the US, 1948-
1982 (by quarter) (continued on next page)
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25, at 4.
32. E.g., Davenport, supra note 4, at 687; Hibbs, supra note 4, at 8-9.
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Viewing the figure is interesting for it is very informative
about how the different variables relate to one another. For
example, although they appear closely related behavioral threat
(dissent) does not appear to account for variation in state
repression - at least, not completely. While one can see a large
growth in violent dissent in 1957 and 1958 as well as the mid-to
late 1960s, there is no corresponding increase in state
repression during the same time. Non-violent dissent appears
to have more of an impact on repression, emerging in the early
2007]
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1960s, early 1970s, late 1970s and early 1980s, but even here,
the relationship is not as clear as one would expect. For
example, the highest values of non-violence in 1981 and 1982 do
not provoke large-scale applications of state repression.
Additionally, political threats do not appear to account for
variation in state repression - at least, not completely. The
periods of interstate threat (Cold War I and II, noted at the top
of the figure) are associated with the largest amounts of
repression (1965 and 1967) but they also are associated with the
smallest (1950 and 1951). Similarly, the period of Detente
includes a wide range of repressive activity (from a high in 1972
to a low in 1979). Domestic political threats (noted at the top of
the figure) reveal some variation as well. One period of large-
scale threat (Truman-McCarthy) is associated with some of the
lowest applications of repression, while another (Vietnam) is
associated with some of the highest. Additionally, one of the
smaller political threats is associated with the largest growth in
repressive behavior (the Interlude). Of course, while intriguing,
this type of ocular inspection is not definitive. There is neither
a systematic comparison of repression, dissent and threats
offered within this approach nor a consideration of control
variables. I discuss this below.
In addition to the variables identified above, following the
comparative literature on state repression, 33 I attempt to
identify the importance of diverse political and economic
characteristics. For example, to consider an element of
democracy, I employ the yearly Electoral Competition measure
from Keith Poole's (1998) database of roll call votes 4 For this
indicator, I took the number of house and senate democrats for
each congress and divided by 535. This captures the percentage
of democrats in the congress, a theoretically important
characteristic as members of this party are expected to be more
33. E.g., Harff, supra note 4, at 62-65 (naming political upheaval, prior
genocides, autocratic and ideological political systems, ethnic and religious
cleavages, low economic development and international economic and political
interdependence as main predictors of genocidal activity); Poe et. al., supra note 4,
at 292 ("past levels of repression, democracy, population size, economic standing,
and threats in the form of international and civil wars were statistifcally significant
and at least moderately important determinants of repression levels). See generally
Hibbs, supra note 4 (analyzing various economic, social, and political indicators);
Davenport et. al., supra note 4 (discussing the effect of democracy on violations of
human rights).
34. Keith Poole, Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales, 42 Am. J.
Political Sci. 954, 982-989 (1998).
[Vol. 16:2
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respectful of citizens' rights.35 In an effort to measure another
aspect of democracy (checks and balances), I consider the degree
of divided government within the US (also on a yearly basis).
This was coded "1" if the president was of a different party than
congress and zero otherwise. In line with the literature on veto
players, 36 this provides a measure of institutional restraint for
the president would have to, at a minimum, convince members
of a rival political party to acquiesce to the demand for
repression and/or be subject to the efforts of this rival in
hindering repressive activity. To address economic
development, I rely upon four quarterly variables: Real GNP in
1996 dollars, change in GNP, the unemployment rate and the
change in the unemployment rate.37  As discussed within
comparative literature, developed economies tend to reduce
applications of state repression because they offer alternative
mechanisms for socio-political control.38 I seek to examine this
explicitly.
A. METHODOLOGY
While most research in the area of state repression and
human rights violation has employed some variant of OLS
regression, newer investigations tend to tailor their selection of
statistical techniques more specifically to the type of data that
they use. Following this trend, I rely upon a variant of negative
binomial maximum-likelihood regression 39  to estimate
relationships. This technique allows one to deal with panel data
- in particular, the "nbreg" command in STATA40  The
application of this methodology is appropriate because other
research 4' suggests that previous investigations of repression
35. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6 at 560-565 (standing for the proposition that
the decisions of political authorities is the primary factor in political repression).
36. See generally Philip Keefer, The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central
Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy, 97 Am. Political Sci.
Rev. 407 (2003) (giving a brief outline of veto player theory as it pertains to
monetary policy).
37. This quarterly economic data is available at: http://economics.about.com/
cs/datasources/a'quarterlydata.htm (follow hyperlink to "Right Click Here to
Download the Quarterly Data").
38. See DALLIN & BRESLAUER, supra note 7, at 5-9.
39. See generally SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND
LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997).
40. STATA2001, 386-394.
41. See, e.g., Mathew Krain, State-Sponsored Mass Murder: A Study of the
Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 331
2007]
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and human rights violation have not carefully dealt with the
problems of left censoring and over-dispersion within event
data, which may lead to substantial bias in the parameter
estimates. Negative binomial regression addresses these
problems.
IV. FINDINGS
I begin my statistical analysis with an evaluation of
conventional wisdom (Table 1, model 1). Consistent with earlier
work, I find that violent and non-violent dissident behavior as
well as lagged repression increase repressive action. I
anticipated the similar positive influence of all three variables,
but not the similar magnitudes of influence (revealed by the
incident rate ratio), which refutes Hypothesis 8 that violent
dissent is more influential than non-violence on state
repression.
Within model 2, I introduce variables concerning diverse
political42 and economic characteristics. 43 From the results, I
find that while behavioral threat and previous repression retain
their significance as well as causal direction, none of the
contextual variables wield any statistically significant influence.
Given these findings, I removed these variables from the
remaining statistical models. 44
Table 1. Negative Binomial Models for US State Repression
(N=1 40)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Non-Violent Dissent 1,009* 1.008* 1.007*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Violent Dissent 1.01 6* 1.016* 1.014*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged Repression 1.026* 1.022* 1.019*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
(1997) (drawing upon the work of Gary King, Event Count Models for International
Relations: Generalizations and Applications, 33 INT'L STUD. Q. 123 (1989)).
42. The variables I introduced were (1) divided government and (2) electoral
competition.
43. The variables I introduced were (1) real GNP, (2) percent change in GNP,
(3) unemployment rate, and (4) the change in unemployment rate.
44. Within other versions of this paper, I retained these variables and found
that they were consistently insignificant. These are available from the author.
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GNP
Change in GNP
Electoral Competition
Unemployment Rate
Change in
Unemployment Rate
Coldwarl
Coldwar2
Interlude
Vietnam
Carter
Reagan
Ln(Alpha)
Alpha
Legend: Main entries are incident rate rations [exp(b)],
errors in parentheses. * p< 0.05
robust standard
Introducing international and domestic political threats
into the examination (Table 1, model 3),45 results disclose that
dissent and lagged repression still wield statistically significant
influences on repressive behavior - in the same direction and at
comparable levels to that identified above. Supporting
Hypothesis 1, results also disclose that "political threats"
generally increase repressive activity. Supporting Hypothesis 2,
results disclose that these influences generally exceed those of
45. Here, I employ the period of D6tente as the control category for the former
and the Truman-McCarthy period as the control category for the latter.
1.048
(0.038)
1.051
(0.192)
1.001
(0.064)
9.025
(12.145)
0.996
(0.132)
1.079*
(0.212)
0.524*
(0.167)
2.031 *
(0.439)
1.997*
(0.513)
3.885*
(1.700)
3.780*
(1.591)
-1.547*
(-0.198)
0.212*
(0.042)
-1.365*
(0.199)
0.255*
(0.050)
-1.464*
(-0.199)
0.231*
(0.046)
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behavioral threat. At the same time, I find that the inclusion of
these variables does not substantively alter the influence of the
conflict measures (refuting Hypothesis 3). While the general
findings bode well for my argument, the hierarchy of influences
was different than anticipated.
Without exception, domestic threats are larger in terms of
their impact on state repression when compared to international
threats. Additionally, the largest political threats, Truman-
McCarthy (1948-1954) and Vietnam (1965-1975), did not result
in the largest amount of repression - in fact, the latter had one
of the weakest influences. Rather, the periods of Carter and
Reagan (1981-1982) revealed the largest influences, political
threats that I argued were more limited in scope. These
findings are particularly interesting because while invocations
of communism (at home and abroad), anti-radicalism and anti-
subversion were widely associated with Reagan's administration
(Curry 1988; Zwerman 1990), the period associated with Carter
was not; indeed, the latter is commonly believed to be one of
most pacific periods within US history. The Interlude (between
1955 and 1964) continued many anti-Red practices of the
Truman-McCarthy period but at a much lower level and thus it
makes little sense that this would be third in terms of overall
influence on repression.
A. INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIPS
As discussed above, I not only anticipated that political
threats would exhibit direct influences on state repression, but I
also argued that there would be interactive influences as well
(Hypothesis 3).
At first thought, it would appear that an investigation of
interactive relationships would be simple. One would just
consider the influence of violent dissent during Cold War I
(when the latter was coded 1) and compare this to periods after
this time (when the latter was coded 0). The problem with this
approach is that it does not adequately capture the complexity
of the situation. For example, there are actually two sets of
dummy variables in the model representing political threats.
The first set operationalizes international historical context -
these are Cold War I and Cold War II (with the period of
Detente left out as the excluded category). The second set
operationalizes domestic political context - these are Interlude,
Vietnam, Carter and Reagan (with the Truman-McCarthy
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period as the excluded category). While interested in the
distinct effects of these two sets of variables, it is clear that they
overlap. This is important because one would need to
incorporate this directly into investigations since these two sets
of historical context dummy variables work together to shift the
intercept (the baseline count) up or down for these different
combinations.
Guided by this information, it is clear that in order to
investigate interactive relationships, one would need to examine
the influence of dissent and lagged repression by historical
periods of international as well as domestic threat. This
acknowledges that the two overlap and explicitly forces us to
include such information into the estimation process.
From this model, I identify that there were seven historical
periods between 1948 and 1982. For the analysis, I examine
periods four and five together as well as periods six and seven.
This was done for two reasons: 1) they each represent distinct
historical periods (the former identifies the period of Vietnam
and the latter identifies Cold War II); and 2) the number of
observations within some of these periods were quite small,
precluding rigorous investigation.
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Table 2. The Effects of Violent Dissent, Non-Violent Dissent and
Previous Repression on Current Repression by Historical Period -
Negative Binomial Regression
U,
-COE 
=V CuO
CC
_ CuO
._0 0 -- _
0(D
CO Ca CO
_~C Cu0
Ca Cu Cu E E C
CU CZ cccc
= -Z
0 0 0 > > 0 3n"c
Period Period
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 4r5 6/74/5 6/7
Violent 1.291 1.01 6* 1.016* 1.012* 1.000
Dissent (0.351) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000)
Non- 1.064 1.012* 1.011* 1.005 1.049*
Violent (0.035) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
Dissent
Sanctionst. 0.930 1.021* 1.000 1.025* 1.003
1 (0.043) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012)
2.611* 4.966* 6.740* 4.415* 5.704*
Intercept (0.299) (0.201) (0.221) (0.178) (0.189)
Legend: Main entries are incident rate rations [exp(b)], robust
standard errors in parentheses. * p< 0.05
Upon observing the empirical results (provided in Table 2),
there are numerous findings that are worthy of discussion. For
example, results disclose that both forms of dissent increase
repression. This further supports the Law of Coercive
Monopolization because political challenges increase state
coercive behavior - presumably to counter/eliminate it.
Interestingly, there is some variation across contentious
behavior and across periods. As found, non-violent dissent is
positive in its influence on repression but only in periods 2 (Cold
War I and the Interlude), 3 (Cold War I and Vietnam) and 6/7
(Cold War II with Carter as well as Reagan). Violent dissent is
also positive in its influence on repressive behavior but only in
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periods 2, 3 and 4/5 (Vietnam as well as Cold War II and
Vietnam). Lagged repression increases the likelihood of
subsequent repression but only in periods 2 and 4/5. The
finding is especially important because within these two
contexts international threats are present and domestic threats
are limited/selective (Cold War I and the Interlude [2]) and
international threats are mixed and domestic threats are
encompassing (Vietnam and Detente [41 as well as Cold War II
and Vietnam [5]). Consequently, authorities were most likely
influenced by previous repressive activity exactly when the
reinforcing nature of political threats was lacking. Finally,
results disclose that the amount of repression expected within
each period varies significantly - all else held constant.
Observing the intercept, the most repression was expected
during the period of Cold War I and Vietnam (period 3), followed
by Cold War II with Carter and Reagan (period 6/7), Cold War I
and the Interlude (period 2), Vietnam as well as Cold War II
and Vietnam (period 4/5) and finally Cold War I (period 1).
These results generally reflect well upon my theoretical
argument - albeit with somewhat greater complexity than
anticipated. For instance, political threats (as identified by the
intercept) are the most important variables within each of the
estimated models, supporting Hypothesis 2 that political threats
outweigh the influence of behavioral threats; in fact, the former
exceeds the latter by 2 to 6 times. Periods within which threats
are identified at international and domestic levels (e.g., Cold
War I and Vietnam [3] and Cold War II with Carter as well as
Reagan [6/7]) tend to have more repression than periods when
either international threats are mixed and domestic threats are
encompassing (Vietnam and Detente [4] as well as Cold War II
and Vietnam [5]) or when international threats exist and
domestic threats are limited/selective (Cold War I and the
Interlude [2]). This tends to move against Hypothesis 5 which
maintained that either selective or encompassing threats were
consistently greater than the other, but it does suggest that the
combination of international and domestic threats is important
- an argument that was not considered earlier.
Refuting Hypothesis 3, there is no difference in state
responsiveness to either type of dissent across historical periods.
According to the results, US political authorities were just as
likely to respond to dissent under a situation of international
threat and selective targeting of domestic threats as they were
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during a period of international threat and extensive targeting
of domestic threats. The only exception here is Cold War I
(period 1) where there was no influence on repression identified
at all.
The results concerning types of political threat are mixed.
Again, observing the intercept, while the largest amount of
repression is associated with international and domestically
encompassing political threats (Cold War I and Vietnam -
period 3), another period of high international and domestic
political threats (Cold War I and Truman-McCarthy - period 1)
is statistically insignificant and the other period associated with
international threat, Vietnam as well as Cold War II and
Vietnam (period 4/5), is lower in magnitude than the two
international and domestically limited political threats (Cold
War I and the Interlude [period 2] as well as Cold War II viewed
during Carter and Reagan [period 6/7]).
Finally, I consider the influence of behavioral threat. As
discussed in Hypothesis 4, I expected that the influence of this
variable would outweigh the influence of political threats. This
was not the case; political threats consistently outweighed
dissent, regardless of type. Drawing upon existing literature, in
Hypothesis 5, I maintained that the influence of dissent on
repression would be constant over time and results confirmed
this expectation. In conjunction with the findings above,
however, concerning the varied influence of distinct historical
periods, this result actually lends greater support to my
licensing argument for it suggests that the differences in
government response could not possibly be attributed to the
influence of dissident behavior. Rather, it is the distinct
political threats that increased state repression. Regarding
Hypothesis 6, my results did not support the argument that the
influence of violent dissent exceeded that of non-violent dissent;
indeed, according to the statistical findings of this research, the
effects were more or less comparable. Essentially, US political
authorities were just as likely to employ repression in response
to violent dissent as they were to non-violent dissident behavior.
CONCLUSION
For almost 40 years, researchers have maintained that
authorities respond to political dissent with state repression to
maintain the status quo. The activities of the U.S. government
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following 9/11 declared a domestic war against terror are based
on such an argument. This finding has so consistently been
identified that it stands as perhaps the only law within the area
of state-dissident interactions - the Law of Coercive
Monopolization: dissent sometimes responds to repression, but
repression always responds to dissent. This argument is not
without alternatives, however, which have to date been
unexamined. For example, within this study, I was interested
in understanding the relative importance of behavioral threats
(dissent) compared to another form of threat - political threats
(periods within which authorities identify that potential
challenges exist).
To investigate this topic, I analyzed state-societal relations
in the United States from 1948 to 1982. From the results, I find
that there were indeed distinct phases in the application of
repressive activity. During periods when international and
domestic political threats were present, repression increased,
regardless of behavioral threats. During periods when either of
these conditions did not exist, repressive behavior was much
less likely - again, regardless of behavioral threats.
Additionally, I find that political threats were generally largely
in their effects on repression than behavioral threats. If one
were interested in understanding when repressive behavior is
applied, they would be well advised to understand the latter as
opposed to the former.
The exploration of these issues is important for several
reasons. To date, our understanding of state repression has
been significantly influenced by a domestic realist model where
the repressive response to dissent has been central to this
research. Additionally, a political model has significantly
influenced our understanding of state repression where the
degree of democracy held by a political system conditions the
state's response to contentious behavior away from repression.
While useful in guiding research, this work has predisposed
those interested in the topic against investigating exactly what
role the state plays in the repressive process. Relevant to the
"War on Terror," researchers have been focused on terrorists
and terrorism and less on government officials and repression
(commonly referred to as counter-terrorism). Upon little
reflection, however, it is clear that governments can and do
establish political threats without dissent being present and
they can and do establish political threats in autocracies as well
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as in democracies. For example, following the terrorist attacks
in Washington, DC and New York, relevant authorities
established a political threat and legislation as well as other
measures effectively institutionalized the government's
response to this behavioral challenge. 46 After the two attacks,
however, there was no more dissent undertaken by Al-Qaeda in
the US (e.g., additional acts of terrorism or protests). Indeed,
this was precisely the reason for the establishment of the threat
and repressive behavior - to assure that there would be no other
actions taken. When will the repression after 9/11 be lifted? If
behavioral regulation is not the criteria to evaluate repression,
then what is?
While quite familiar to those interested in and aware of the
US case, what is important about this process is that existing
research generally ignores the issues outlined above.
Specifically, it ignores exactly how the establishment of political
threats influences actual state-dissident interactions. In the
context of more encompassing political threats, are we more
likely to find states using repression, are we less likely to find
relevant actions or laws withdrawn, are we more likely to see
severe forms of repressive behavior and are we likely to find
fewer challenges or fewer challengers engaged in dissent
throughout civil society? We simply do not know. In part, this
is because these questions have not been asked. In part, this is
because researchers have been more concerned with political
threats and public opinion about infringements on political and
civil liberties4v than they have been with political threats and
their influence on actual infringements of these rights.48 This is
beginning to change as the ramifications of the US Patriot Act
and Homeland Security come under greater scrutiny.
Unfortunately, however, we are far from understanding the
implications of such behavior for contentious politics and
political freedom.
My response to this situation is simple. We need to focus on
46. DHS: Homeland Security Advisory System, http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/
programs/Copyofpress release_0046.shtm. The Department of Homeland
Security's "Threat Advisory" provides information about threats consistently over
time. Id.
47. See, e.g., Davis and Silver supra note 19 (explicating the relationship
between people's sense of threat and their support for civil liberties).
48. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Political Intolerance and Political Repression
During the McCarthy Red Scare, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 511 (1988) (examining the
influence of public opinion on repression).
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what authorities do coercively but also what they do to
facilitate, promote or hinder such activities: e.g., making
pronouncements and enacting laws, which may or may not
influence state behavior. In short, we must "bring politics back
into" the study of state repression. To accomplish this, we must
collect the data necessary for such an analysis. At present, we
do not collect information on how governments justify their
behavior but it is imperative that we compile this information
because it may provide insights into the decision-making
process that authorities engage in when they decide to use or
abstain from using repressive action. Within existing research,
much of this process is inferred from diverse structural
characteristics and behavior, but it is clear that such
information would be useful for understanding exactly why
authorities use repression. If we are better able to understand
this process, then we may be able to get some leverage on better
understanding exactly how authorities use repressive activity
and when changes are likely to occur in the application of this
behavior. In sum, bringing politics back into the study of
repression might just make it relevant to current popular
debates in the US and abroad about state power, human rights,
protest policing and democracy and, at the same time, it might
just make it relevant for current mobilization around social
activism and political reform as well.
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